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Pointing back to previous statements with the wax analogy, only intellect is capable of perceiving in clear and distinct manners, and thus the certainty of the thinking being to exist as long as the person is thinking comes from pure understanding through intellect; the mind and intellect are similar in nature to each other but different in nature and only act as unity in composition with the body (there is body and mind in a being operating separately) (AT VII 423). Additionally, since, as stated before, the knowing of the intellect’s or the mind’s capability to judge and understand is certain, it confirms that the nature of the mind, capable of thinking is better known than the bodies (wax).

By reasoning why the senses and imaginations are not capable of perceiving what is, and by stating how intellect alone is capable for all clear and distinct perceptions, the meditator concludes not only that the nature of the mind is better known than the bodies, but also concludes that she can know with certainty her existence and that she is a thinking thing.

Reference:
Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Vol. VII. p.16-23.

By: Kaung

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As with clarification regarding the senses, one may additionally argue that after the changeability, flexibility and extension of the wax are stripped from the characters of the wax, it is still the imagination judging what the naked wax really is or the nature of it (AT VII 272). However if one looks into this deeply, one will see that imagination brings “confused perceptions” because there is so much to imagine about what the wax really is but with intellect, “reflective and distinct perceptions” are obtained because only intellect and it’s involvement in thinking, judging and understanding the nature from the observed accidents are left out with certainty (AT VII 359).

If not by the senses and the imaginations, the meditator concludes that only the intellect can know the wax. Dependence on the senses and imaginations can only give uncertain imperfect perception of the wax, but when intellect alone is applied, certain and distinct perception can be experienced.  For instance, people will say they see the car, the wax, or the bodies but such perceptions can be doubtful because they can argue the validity of the existence of those bodies. However, the intellect is the one responsible for judging that what perceived through the senses and imaginations are really what they are and have been; intellect understands purely the previous roughly understood, known visible bodies.

Similarly and furthermore, as people discover more external bodies, through intellect they can lead themselves out of confused stages and to clear and distinct stages instead. Regardless of how many external bodies are out there, the intellect can and will understand. As people discover more, the intellect helps understand greater bodies. Thus the meditator may not know what other sensible attributes of the bodies (wax) are out there, but can know for certain the intellect will be able to understand.

And as long as things are perceived through the senses and imagination (though with doubts) and through intellect (with clear understanding), they confirm that the meditator is a thinking being.  Other bodily movements and external actions cannot confirm the existence because they can be deceived such as in walking; “walk” part in “I walk, I exist” is doubtful (AT VII 352). However the thinking part in “I think, I exist” isn’t doubtful for doubting is also thinking. This leads to state that since the meditator is a thinking being and is thinking or thinks, the meditator exists (the “I” exist”), and that this thinking is separable from the bodily attributes.

By: Kaung

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To clarify her conclusion, the meditator reasons that senses are not responsible for knowing and she gives the wax experience to prove it. The wax is first observed in all five qualities: taste, smell, touch, sound, and sight, and also by the shape and the size. The meditator observes that the fresh hard wax, which gives a cracking sound when hit with knuckles, has honey taste and scent.  However, as it is heated, she sees that hard wax liquefies giving a puddle with no sounds when hit, and is lost of its taste and scent (AT VII 30). From there she concludes that senses could not be responsible to let her still know that it is the same wax because she has just seen, right in front of her, the changeability and flexibility of the wax through the senses.

One may argue at this point that even though senses can change, they are still the main sources to provide necessary basic information about the bodies (wax in this case). This argument is understandable but not acceptable because apart from possibility of being deceived by an evil deceiver, even though senses perceive information of the bodies, they can only gather general partial information. For instance, senses can only show that wax changes in shape, color, smell but can’t judge that the wax before and after are the same. In the following passages, one will see that imagination is not capable of making this distinction either.

After showing the incapability of knowing by means of senses, the meditator moves to see if it is due to imagination. From the observation of the flexibility, the meditator asserts that the body (of the wax) had extended; the shape of wax transformed from being solid to liquid, and if it were to be heated longer, it could become larger space taking thing. Since the bodies are shapes that take space, and wax is an extendable body, the meditator categorizes wax as a space taking, transformable thing. However, even though it can be transformed into many shapes, the meditator is not able to imagine all the possible shapes because of the infinite amounts; the wax or its shapes can be imagined as triangular, flat, round, pyramidal, and many others or in between. Thus imagination could not have grasped the fact that it is the same wax, or in the case of searching for what “I” is, imagination would not be good enough to see all the possibilities of what it is in pure form.

By: Kaung

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In Second Meditation in Volume VII of the standard edition of Descartes (AT VII), the meditator’s search for certainty leads to the conclusion of the kind of being she is, along with the conditions that support her existence, and how the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of the bodies. The meditator provides the readers with the wax analogy to give the readers a better understanding. What and how the meditator comes about to her reasoning about her existence, the defining of the word “I”, the analogy of the wax, the incapability of the senses and imaginations to grasp the pure knowledge, the reason why only the intellect can know will be discussed here, ending with the nature of mind being known better than the nature of bodies.

First, how the meditator reaches to the investigation of the piece of wax and what she is trying to prove by it will be explained. The meditator is trying to discover what kind of being she is, to make certain her existence, and to prove that the nature of the human mind is better known than the body through intellect alone. Initially, the meditator is searching for the certainty and discarding anything that can raise doubts. As “Archimedes used to demand one immovable point to shift the entire earth”, she wants to find one certainty (a point) to understand or be on path to understand further greater things (AT VII 24).

In order to find the certainty, the meditator implies that first everything must be rejected and built back up discarding the doubtful things (AT VII 18). The bodies, according to her, can be doubtful because the existence could be deceived by an evil deceiver (AT VII 22), the thing possibly deceiving her to believe and see everything being experienced at the moment. However, the meditator deduces that thinking and own existence are of certainty because whether thinking or deceived by the deceiver who made things doubtful to her, she must be thinking in order to doubt and that being a thinking being, to be deceived needs her to exist; if she doesn’t exist, the deceiver will not have her to deceive. From there, the meditator comes to the point to state “I am, I exist” but yet had no understanding of what the “I” is (AT VII 25). After considerable thinking, the meditator comes to conclude that the “I” is not just a thing that thinks, wills, and understands but also the thing which imagines and senses. The meditator states that such conclusion and knowing of the “I” wasn’t reached through imaginations or the senses and clarifies using the analogy of the wax.

By: Kaung

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