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As with clarification regarding the senses, one may additionally argue that after the changeability, flexibility and extension of the wax are stripped from the characters of the wax, it is still the imagination judging what the naked wax really is or the nature of it (AT VII 272). However if one looks into this deeply, one will see that imagination brings “confused perceptions” because there is so much to imagine about what the wax really is but with intellect, “reflective and distinct perceptions” are obtained because only intellect and it’s involvement in thinking, judging and understanding the nature from the observed accidents are left out with certainty (AT VII 359).

If not by the senses and the imaginations, the meditator concludes that only the intellect can know the wax. Dependence on the senses and imaginations can only give uncertain imperfect perception of the wax, but when intellect alone is applied, certain and distinct perception can be experienced.  For instance, people will say they see the car, the wax, or the bodies but such perceptions can be doubtful because they can argue the validity of the existence of those bodies. However, the intellect is the one responsible for judging that what perceived through the senses and imaginations are really what they are and have been; intellect understands purely the previous roughly understood, known visible bodies.

Similarly and furthermore, as people discover more external bodies, through intellect they can lead themselves out of confused stages and to clear and distinct stages instead. Regardless of how many external bodies are out there, the intellect can and will understand. As people discover more, the intellect helps understand greater bodies. Thus the meditator may not know what other sensible attributes of the bodies (wax) are out there, but can know for certain the intellect will be able to understand.

And as long as things are perceived through the senses and imagination (though with doubts) and through intellect (with clear understanding), they confirm that the meditator is a thinking being.  Other bodily movements and external actions cannot confirm the existence because they can be deceived such as in walking; “walk” part in “I walk, I exist” is doubtful (AT VII 352). However the thinking part in “I think, I exist” isn’t doubtful for doubting is also thinking. This leads to state that since the meditator is a thinking being and is thinking or thinks, the meditator exists (the “I” exist”), and that this thinking is separable from the bodily attributes.

By: Kaung

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